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The Conventions of Constitutional 
Amendment in Canada
RICHARD ALBERT*
Commentators have suggested that the unsuccessful national referendum to ratify the 1992 
Charlottetown Accord created an expectation of popular participation requiring national 
referendal consultation in major reforms to the Constitution of Canada. In this article, I 
inquire whether federal political actors are bound by a constitutional convention of national 
referendal consultation for formal amendments to the basic structure of the Constitution 
of Canada. Drawing from the Supreme Court of Canada’s Patriation Reference, I suggest 
that we cannot know whether federal political actors are bound by such a convention until 
they are confronted with the question whether or not to hold a national referendum in 
connection with a change to the Constitution’s basic structure. I conclude by suggesting, 
perhaps counterintuitively, that layering a conventional requirement of national referendal 
consultation onto the existing requirements for formal amendments to the Constitution’s 
basic structure could well undermine democracy, despite our common association of 
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referenda with democratic legitimacy. I suggest instead that a national referendum should 
be an alternative path, not an additional step, in constitutional amendment.
Des observateurs ont suggéré que l’échec du référendum national proposé pour ratifier en 
1992 l’Accord de Charlottetown a créé l’attente d’une participation populaire exigeant la tenue 
de consultations référendaires nationales pour chaque réforme majeure de la Constitution 
canadienne. Dans cet article, je me demande si les politiciens fédéraux sont liés par une 
convention constitutionnelle exigeant la tenue de consultations référendaires nationales pour 
amender formellement la structure fondamentale de la Constitution canadienne. M’inspirant 
du renvoi de la Cour suprême relatif au rapatriement de la Constitution canadienne, j’avance 
qu’il sera impossible de savoir si les politiciens fédéraux sont liés par une telle convention 
jusqu’au moment où ils seront confrontés à la question de savoir s’il sera nécessaire de 
tenir un référendum national pour amender la structure fondamentale de la Constitution. 
Je conclus en suggérant, peut-être contre-intuitivement que, malgré l’association que nous 
faisons communément entre référendums et légitimité démocratique, superposer l’exigence 
conventionnelle d’une consultation référendaire nationale aux exigences qui accompagnent 
déjà tout amendement formel de la structure fondamentale de la Constitution pourrait bien 
miner la démocratie. Je suggère au contraire qu’un référendum national devrait constituer 
une voie alternative plutôt qu’une étape additionnelle aux amendements constitutionnels.
CODIFIED CONSTITUTIONS COMMONLY ENTRENCH formal amendment rules 
authorizing alterations to their text.1 These rules, however, are susceptible to 
informal changes, as I have shown is the case in Canada, where the Constitution’s 
escalating structure of formal amendment has been modified by judicial 
interpretation, federal and provincial law, and political practice.2 Partly codified 
1. See Francesco Giovannoni, “Amendment Rules in Constitutions” (2003) 115:1-2 Pub 
Choice 37 at 37.
2. Richard Albert, “Constitutional Amendment by Stealth” (2015) 60:4 McGill LJ 673 at 
689-92 [Albert, “Amendment by Stealth”].
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and uncodified, the Constitution of Canada is peculiarly susceptible to informal 
changes that arise when new constitutional conventions fill or create a void in 
the constitutional text, or when they refine or substitute parts of the text.3 Two 
examples in Canada are the twin conventions that now exist against using the 
powers of reservation and disallowance—powers that nonetheless remain textually 
entrenched.4 The susceptibility of the Constitution of Canada to informal 
changes like these raises an important question: Could the Constitution’s formal 
amendment rules be changed informally by a constitutional convention?
For much of Canadian history, with only a few exceptions,5 the power to 
formally amend the codified Constitution of Canada6 belonged to the Parliament 
of the United Kingdom.7 Canada finally acquired the power to formally amend its 
own constitution more than a century after Confederation, when the Constitution 
Act, 1982 created an escalating structure of formal amendment that was fully and 
independently deployable by Canadian political actors.8 It took roughly fifteen 
unsuccessful attempts over the course of six decades to reach agreement on the 
intricate design of these rules.9
Soon after the coming into force of the Constitution Act, 1982, Canada’s 
new formal amendment rules became the subject of major constitutional reform 
3. Richard Albert, “How Unwritten Constitutional Norms Change Written Constitutions” 
(2015) 38:2 Dublin U LJ 387 [Albert, “Unwritten Constitutional Norms”].
4. See Richard Albert, “Constitutional Amendment by Constitutional Desuetude” (2014) 62:3 
Am J Comp L 641 at 660-69 [Albert, “Constitutional Desuetude”].
5. See Richard Albert, “Amending Constitutional Amendment Rules” (2015) 13:3 Int’l J Const 
L 655 at 673 [Albert, “Constitutional Amendment Rules”] (identifying exceptions to the 
general rule that only the Imperial Parliament could amend the Constitution).
6. Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, App II, No 5 
[Constitution Act, 1867].
7. See Richard S Kay, “Constitutional Chrononomy” (2000) 13:1 Ratio Juris 31 at 42.
8. See Constitution Act, 1982, pt V, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 
[Constitution Act, 1982].
9. See James Ross Hurley, Amending Canada’s Constitution: History, Processes, Problems and 
Prospects (Ottawa: Canada Communication Group, 1996) at 25-63. It is unclear, however, 
whether the rules were intended to be permanent. See Richard H Leach, “Implications 
for Federalism of the Reformed Constitution of Canada” (1982) 45:4 Law & Contemp 
Probs 149 at 156. The Constitution Act, 1982 instructed Canada’s first ministers to meet 
within fifteen years in an intergovernmental conference to review the Constitution’s new 
amendment rules. See Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 8, s 49. Canada’s first ministers met 
on 20-21 June 1996 to review the Constitution’s formal amendment rules. It is reported 
that the discussion on this subject “was of very short duration and there was no decision on 
how further discussion might be pursued on this matter.” See Canadian Intergovernmental 
Conference Secretariat, First Ministers’ Conferences: 1906-2004 (Ottawa: CICS, 2004) at 103, 
online: <www.scics.gc.ca/CMFiles/fmp_e.pdf>.
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efforts in the 1987 Meech Lake Accord10 and 1992 Charlottetown Accord.11 
Both efforts failed, the former due in part to a time limitation for legislative 
ratification12 and the latter as a result of outright public repudiation.13 In an 
interesting twist, however, these formal amendment failures may have set into 
motion an informal constitutional change to Canada’s formal amendment 
rules.14 More specifically, political actors may have informally altered the textually 
entrenched rules of constitutional change by incorporating into the tradition 
of Canada’s uncodified constitution a conventional requirement of national 
referendal consultation—an unwritten rule that is by definition altogether absent 
from the rules textually prescribed in the Constitution Act, 1982 for formally 
amending the Constitution of Canada.15
Commentators have suggested that the unsuccessful national referendum 
held in connection with the Charlottetown Accord has created an expectation of 
popular participation requiring national referendal consultation in future major 
constitutional reforms.16 The argument seems compelling: In 1992, the federal 
government chose to require a national consultative referendum as part of the 
amendment process to ratify the Charlottetown Accord, and it must do so again 
in the future because the Charlottetown referendum has created a precedent that 
binds federal actors.17 But the argument, however compelling it may appear, 
must be tested. The question, then, is whether the federal government’s decision 
to hold a referendum on the Charlottetown Accord has since matured into a 
constitutional convention.18 If indeed the Charlottetown referendum is today 
a binding precedent entrenched as a convention in the unwritten Constitution 
of Canada, this change should be understood as an informal amendment to the 
10. Meeting of the First Ministers on the Constitution, The 1987 Constitutional Accord (Ottawa: 
3 June 1987) [Meech Lake Accord].
11. Coordinating Committee, Consensus Report of the Constitution: Final Text, Doc 
CP22-45/1992E (Charlottetown: 27-28 August 1992) [Charlottetown Accord].
12. See the text accompanying notes 38-41.
13. See the text accompanying notes 54-64.
14. See the text accompanying notes 93-100.
15. See Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 8, ss 38-49.
16. For further elaboration of this point, see infra note 93.
17. See the text accompanying notes 93-98.
18. In this article, I will follow the Canadian practice of using the term referendum to 
refer to both binding and non-binding direct popular votes, although the scholarly 
literature distinguishes between a referendum, which is binding, and a plebiscite, 
which is non-binding. I will refer variously to either binding or non-binding referenda. 
See Don Rowat, “Our Referendums are not Direct Democracy” (1998) 21:3 Can 
Parliamentary Rev 25 at 25. 
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written Constitution of Canada because Canada’s formal amendment rules do not 
require direct popular participation to either propose or ratify an amendment.19 
They require only federal or provincial legislative action, or both in tandem, to 
formally amend the constitution.20 
In this article, I draw from constitutional law, history, and theory to evaluate 
the suggestion that the use of the referendum in the Charlottetown Accord 
has matured into a constitutional convention. I inquire specifically whether a 
convention now exists that binds federal actors to hold a national referendum 
for any formal amendment to the basic structure of the Constitution of Canada. 
I explore whether the convention operates in the context of what Peter Russell 
defines as “mega constitutional politics.”21 Russell coined the term to refer to 
amendments that “[address] the very nature of the political community on which 
the constitution is based”22 and that have a “tendency to touch citizens’ sense of 
identity and self-worth.”23 As he explains, “Mega constitutional politics, whether 
directed towards comprehensive constitutional change or not, is concerned 
with reaching agreement on the identity and fundamental principles of the 
body politic.”24 Mega constitutional politics, then, seeks major reforms to the 
framework of government. 
The Constitution of Canada’s escalating structure of formal amendment 
identifies which matters trigger mega constitutional politics.25 Amending the 
matters amendable pursuant to the default multilateral amendment procedure 
entrenched in section 38, as well as those amendable pursuant only to the 
unanimity amendment procedure entrenched in section 41, would result in a 
fundamental change to the polity, to Canadian identity, and to federal-provincial 
relations. In short, they would change the basic structure of the Constitution 
of Canada. These are the amendable matters for which I explore whether a 
federal convention of national referendal consultation has taken root. I conclude 
that we cannot know whether such a convention has developed until federal 
political actors are again confronted with the question whether or not to hold 
19. See Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 8, ss 38-49.
20. Ibid.
21. See Peter H Russell, Constitutional Odyssey: Can Canadians Become a Sovereign People?, 2nd 




25. See the text accompanying notes 80-87.
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a national referendum in connection with a change to the basic structure of the 
Constitution of Canada.26
I begin in Part I by returning to 1982. I trace briefly the constitutional 
and political context surrounding the Charlottetown Accord and I explain the 
impetus for political actors to initiate a referendum. In Part II, I examine the 
role and development of conventions in Canadian constitutional amendment in 
order then to evaluate, in Part III, whether the Charlottetown referendum has 
created a binding federal precedent amounting to a constitutional convention of 
national referendal consultation for major constitutional reforms. I also return 
again to 1982 to suggest that the pressure currently building behind some form 
of popular participation in major constitutional reform in Canada is a response 
to the failure to properly give voice to the people in the process of patriation in 
1982. In Part IV, I close by suggesting, perhaps counterintuitively, that layering 
a requirement of national referendal consultation onto the existing requirements 
for formal amendments to the Constitution’s basic structure could undermine 
democracy, despite our common association of referenda with democratic 
legitimacy. I suggest instead that a national referendum should be an alternative 
path, not an additional step, in constitutional amendment. I also reflect on the 
susceptibility of the Constitution of Canada to informal constitutional change. 
I. THE CHARLOTTETOWN ACCORD REFERENDUM
The Constitution Act, 1982 left unresolved many questions that needed answers 
before constitutional peace could ever be possible in Canada, including whether 
and how to recognize the special status of Quebec, how to reform national 
institutions to assuage provincial alienation, and how to justly operationalize the 
right of self-government for First Nations.27 The Meech Lake Accord, negotiated 
in 1987 only a few years after the patriation of the Constitution, sought to 
answer some of these questions.28 But its principal purpose, to be sure, was 
reconciling Quebec with the rest of Canada in the aftermath of the adoption 
26. In a related article, I explain more fully the concept of “the basic structure” of a constitution 
with reference to the basic structure doctrine articulated by the Supreme Court of India. See 
Richard Albert, “The Theory and Doctrine of Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment 
in Canada,” (2016) 41 Queen’s LJ 143 at 157.
27. See generally Ronald L Watts, “Canada: Three Decades of Periodic Federal Crises” (1996) 
17:4 Int’l Pol Sci Rev 353 at 357.
28. See Richard Simeon, “Meech Lake and Shifting Conceptions of Canadian Federalism” 
(1988) 14 (supp) Can Pub Pol’y S7 at S13-21.
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of the Constitution Act, 1982 over the province’s objections.29 The Accord was 
designed to address Quebec’s five conditions for finally accepting the Constitution 
Act, 1982: (1) recognition of Quebec’s distinctiveness, (2) a larger provincial role 
in immigration, (3) a provincial role in Supreme Court appointments, (4) limits 
on the federal spending power, and (5) a veto for Quebec on constitutional 
amendments.30 In retrospect, one might fairly suggest that the Accord sought to 
end the “moral exclusion” of Quebec in constitutional politics.31
A. MEECH LAKE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
The Meech Lake Accord proposed to amend both the Constitution Act, 1867 
and the Constitution Act, 1982. As to the former, it would have inserted “the 
recognition that Quebec constitutes within Canada a distinct society,”32 changed 
the method of senatorial selection to require Senate vacancies to be filled from 
a list of nominees proposed by provincial governments,33 and granted provinces 
some power over immigration.34 Among other items, the Accord would also 
have constitutionalized the Supreme Court and required the prime minister 
to convene an annual conference of first ministers.35 As to the Constitution Act, 
1982, the Accord proposed to amend the rules of formal amendment, notably 
by granting a veto to all provinces in connection with amendments to matters of 
provincial interest such as the Supreme Court, proportional representation in the 
House of Commons, as well as senatorial powers, selection, and representation.36 
The Accord also mandated additional constitutional conferences.37
29. See Samuel V LaSelva, The Moral Foundations of Canadian Federalism: Paradoxes, 
Achievements, and Tragedies of Nationhood (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 1996) at 192.
30. See Peter W Hogg, Meech Lake Constitutional Accord Annotated (Toronto: 
Carswell, 1988) at 3-4.
31. Pierre Fournier, A Meech Lake Post-Mortem: Is Quebec Sovereignty Inevitable?, translated by 
Sheila Fischman (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1991) at 15.
32. Meech Lake Accord, supra note 10, Schedule, s 1.
33. Ibid, Schedule, s 2.
34. Ibid, Schedule, s 3.
35. Ibid, Schedule, ss 6, 8.
36. Ibid, Schedule, s 9.
37. Ibid, Schedule, s 13.
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The Meech Lake Accord ultimately collapsed in 1990 when political actors 
failed to ratify it by the three-year deadline arguably required for ratification.38 
Under Canada’s formal amendment rules, some amendment proposals expire 
if they are not ratified within three years.39 This temporal restriction applies to 
a specified class of amendments concerning proportional representation in the 
House of Commons, certain features of the Supreme Court, new provinces and 
provincial boundaries, and senatorial powers, selection, and representation.40 The 
Accord had proposed to amend some of these matters as well as other important 
subjects not subject to any temporal restrictions. The point is that political 
actors eventually ran out of time, though one might plausibly wonder whether 
ratification would have been possible even with more time.41
The 1992 Charlottetown Accord was an effort to make up for both the 
substantive and procedural shortcomings that had felled the Meech Lake 
Accord.42 This new Accord proposed a large-scale overhaul of the Constitution 
of Canada even more transformative than the Meech Lake Accord would have 
been. The Charlottetown Accord proposed once again to recognize that Quebec 
is a “distinct society,”43 but it also proposed to entrench a “Canada Clause” that 
would express Canadian values so as to guide judges in their interpretation of the 
38. See Christopher P Manfredi, “Institutional Design and the Politics of Constitutional 
Modification: Understanding Amendment Failure in the United States and Canada” 
(1997) 31:1 Law & Soc’y Rev 111 at 123. I qualify it as “arguably” required by the 
Constitution because it is not clear that the three-year deadline applied to the entire 
package of amendments. See FL Morton, “How Not to Amend the Constitution” (1989) 
12:4 Can Parliamentary Rev 9 at 9-10. As I explain elsewhere, parts of the Accord 
triggered the three-year deadline and others did not, but political actors nevertheless 
chose to subject the entire Accord to the three-year deadline since the Accord had been 
proposed as an omnibus bill of amendments. See Richard Albert, “Temporal Limitations in 
Constitutional Amendment” (2016) 21 Rev Const Stud [forthcoming], online: <ssrn.com/
abstract=2749288>.
39. See Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 8, s 39(2).
40. Ibid, s 42(1).
41. Elijah Harper, a member of the Manitoba provincial legislature, was a holdout in granting 
unanimous consent to introduce the ratifying motion onto the floor. See Ian Peach, “The 
Power of a Single Feather: Meech Lake, Indigenous Resistance and the Evolution of 
Indigenous Politics in Canada” (2011) 16:1 Rev Const Stud 1 at 10.
42. See e.g. David R Cameron & Jacqueline D Krikorian, “Recognizing Quebec in the 
Constitution of Canada: Using the Bilateral Constitutional Amendment Process” (2008) 
58:4 UTLJ 389 at 393; Harold D Clarke & Allan Kornberg, “The Politics and Economics 
of Constitutional Choice: Voting in Canada’s 1992 National Referendum” (1994) 56:4 J 
Pol 940 at 942-44; Jeffrey J Cole, “Canadian Discord Over the Charlottetown Accord: The 
Constitutional War to Win Quebec” (1993) 11:3 Dick J Int’l L 627 at 642-44.
43. Charlottetown Accord, supra note 11, s I(A)(1).
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Constitution.44 In addition, the Charlottetown Accord would have more robustly 
recognized Aboriginal rights;45 defined, and in some cases redefined, the terms of 
the federal distribution of powers;46 reformed the Senate, House of Commons, and 
the Supreme Court;47 and amended the rules of formal amendment themselves.48 
The Charlottetown Accord also sought to reinforce linguistic rights49 and, as 
with the Meech Lake Accord, to entrench the requirement of an annual first 
ministers’ conference.50
B. THE CHARLOTTETOWN INNOVATION
Canadian political actors took an unusual path to ratify the Charlottetown 
Accord. They submitted the entire Accord to the Canadian electorate in a 
national referendum. This form of referendal consultation was a constitutional 
innovation because the formal amendment rules entrenched in the Constitution 
of Canada did not then, nor do they now, require a national referendum to ratify 
an amendment.51 The Referendum Act, passed roughly four months before the 
referendum, had authorized the Governor General “to obtain by means of a 
referendum the opinion of electors on any question relating to the Constitution 
of Canada.”52 By its terms, the referendum was not legally binding and did not 
constitute a mandatory part of the amendment process. As a legal matter, then, 
the referendum was purely consultative. It was intended only as a discretionary, 
supplementary step in the formal process to adopt the amendment package, 
which required as a matter of constitutional law approval resolutions from the 
Parliament of Canada and each of the provincial assemblies pursuant to the 
unanimity procedure in section 41 of the Constitution Act, 1982.53
The referendum question asked voters whether they agreed that 
“the Constitution of Canada should be renewed on the basis of the 
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid, ss I(A)(2), IV.
46. Ibid, ss I(B), III.
47. Ibid, ss II(A)-(C).
48. Ibid, s V.
49. Ibid, s I(A)(3).
50. Ibid, s II(D).
51. Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 8, ss 38-49.
52. SC 1992, c 30, s 3(1) [Referendum Act].
53. Peter W Hogg, “The Difficulty of Amending the Constitution of Canada” (1993) 31:1 
Osgoode Hall LJ 41 at 42-43.
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[Charlottetown Accord].”54 The proclamation directing the referendum made 
clear that the referendum question had been approved by the House of Commons 
and the Senate, that it was “in the public interest” to “[direct] that the opinion 
of electors be obtained” on the question, and that both provincial and territorial 
electors were called to participate.55 Although the result of the referendum was 
intended by law to be advisory rather than binding on political actors,56 the 
political salience of a majority vote in favour of the Charlottetown Accord would 
have legitimated the amendment package and generated momentum to push it 
through ultimate ratification by the provincial assemblies.57 It would have been 
unimaginable for provincial political actors to oppose the considered judgment 
of their constituents.58 Indeed, the group of first ministers had agreed not to seek 
formal ratification of the Charlottetown Accord unless it had first won majority 
approval in each province in the consultative referendum.59 
Canadians ultimately rejected the Charlottetown Accord by a margin of 54.3 
per cent to 45.7 per cent, with voters in only five of Canada’s ten provinces 
and (at the time) two territories approving the amendment package.60 Political 
actors thereafter chose not to proceed with the textually prescribed procedures for 
formally ratifying the Accord in light of these results.
54. Proclamation Directing a Referendum Relating to the Constitution of Canada, 
Proclamation, 7 October 1992, SI/92-180, online: <laws.justice.gc.ca/eng/regulations/
SI-92-180/page-1.html>.
55. Ibid. Quebec administered its own separate referendum on the matter. See Lawrence LeDuc, 
“Canada’s Constitutional Referendum of 1992: A ‘Great Big No’” (1993) 12:3 Electoral 
Stud 257 at 259.
56. By provincial law, the referendum results in Alberta and British Columbia were binding upon 
their respective legislatures. See Constitutional Referendum Act, RSA 2000, c C-25, s 12(c) 
[Alberta, Referendum Act]; Constitutional Amendment Approval Act, RSBC 1996, c 67, s 1; 
Referendum Act, RSBC 1996, c 400, s 4 [BC, Referendum Act].
57. See Peter H Russell, “The End of Mega Constitutional Politics in Canada?” (1993) 26:1 Pol 
Sci & Politics 33 at 33.
58. Indeed, then Prime Minister Brian Mulroney said it would be “morally unacceptable” 
for governments to proceed with the amendment package if voters had rejected 
it in even one province. See Jeffrey Ulbrich, “Campaign Winds Up for Monday’s 
Referendum,” Associated Press (25 October 1992), online: <www.apnewsarchive.
com/1992/Campaign-Winds-Up-For-Monday-s-Referendum/id-75ee5f5fbc23c3e36
85808917462accb>.
59. Ian Greene, “Constitutional Amendment in Canada and the United States” in Stephen L 
Newman, ed, Constitutional Politics in Canada and the United States (Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 2004) 249 at 257.
60. See Chief Electoral Officer of Canada, The 1992 Federal Referendum: A Challenge Met: Report 
of the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada (Ottawa: Elections Canada, 1994) at 58-59, online: 
<http://www.elections.ca/res/rep/off/1992/1992_Referendum_Part_2_E.pdf>.
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Scholars have attributed the failure of the Charlottetown Accord to many 
factors, from specific ones concerning the details of the package such as displeasure 
with the Canada Clause, confusion about how Aboriginal self-government would 
work alongside federalism in Canada, and unease with the constitutional veto 
power,61 to more general theories of its failure, including amendment overload62 
and the challenge that large-scale constitutional bargaining presents for successful 
amendment.63 Richard Johnston offers the following explanation for the 
Charlottetown Accord’s collapse:
The package Canadians rejected was formidably complex. It became so by a decade’s 
accretion of elements, each calculated to appeal to, or to offset concessions to, 
groups excluded at an earlier stage—Quebec, the western provinces, and aboriginal 
peoples. Negotiators hoped that by 1992 they had finally found an equilibrium, a 
logroll sufficiently inclusive to survive referral to the people. Instead they seem to 
have gotten the logic of the logroll upside down: they may have overestimated both 
how much each group wanted what it got and how intensely some groups opposed 
key concessions to others.64
C. THE IMPETUS FOR REFERENDAL CONSULTATION
The fatal flaw of the Meech Lake Accord was the process by which it had 
been drafted. Federal and provincial elites negotiated the accord in closed 
meetings that would later call into question elite-driven executive federalism as 
a democratically legitimate process for constitutional change in Canada.65 The 
chief constitutional advisor to the Government of Canada at the time, Mary 
Dawson, has acknowledged complaints “that the deal had been cooked up 
61. Joseph A Ghiz, “An Insider’s Perspective of Meech Lake & Charlottetown” (The Dick, 
Ruth and Judy Bell Lecture delivered at Carleton University, Ottawa, 20 October 1993). 
John Whyte also suggests that “popular sentiment recognized the element of political risk 
in minority community rights which, although essential to stabilizing the nation, can also 
be nation-fracturing.” See John D Whyte, “Rejection of Charlottetown Accord Ended Era 
of Constitutional Reform,” Toronto Star (26 October 2012), online: <www.thestar.com/
opinion/editorialopinion/2012/10/26/rejection_of_charlottetown_accord_ended_era_of_
constitutional_reform.html>.
62. See Christopher P Manfredi & Michael Lusztig, “Why do Formal Amendments Fail? An 
Institutional Design Analysis” (1998) 50:3 World Pol 377 at 380.
63. See Michael Lusztig, “Constitutional Paralysis: Why Canadian Constitutional Initiatives Are 
Doomed to Fail” (1994) 27:4 Can J Pol Sci 747 at 748.
64. Richard Johnston, “An Inverted Logroll: The Charlottetown Accord and the Referendum” 
(1993) 26:1 Pol Sci & Politics 43 at 43.
65. See Peter H Russell, “Can the Canadians Be a Sovereign People?” (1991) 24:4 Can J Pol 
Sci 691 at 705-06.
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behind closed doors by a group of men in suits.”66 As Dawson observes, “The 
Charter had given Canadians a sense of empowerment, and they were resisting 
what they characterized as secret deals.”67 As a consequence, the political actors 
who negotiated the details of the Charlottetown Accord rejected the secrecy of 
the Meech Lake Accord and instead embraced transparency. 
It is important to highlight how. Throughout the Charlottetown process, 
federal actors facilitated opportunities for public dialogue with citizens and civic 
groups. They also undertook consultations with First Nations and territorial 
governments. Provincial actors followed suit.68 The federal government created 
a Cabinet Committee on Canadian Unity and Constitutional Affairs that held 
roving meetings across the country in order to underscore its intention to take 
regional concerns into account.69 The federal government also issued publications 
throughout the process to keep Canadians abreast of the questions and proposals 
along the way.70 The process, at least on the federal government’s end, culminated 
with a series of televised conferences intended to inform Canadians about 
different parts of the constitutional reform package.71 And when federal political 
actors met with their provincial, territorial, and Aboriginal counterparts to draft 
the Charlottetown Accord, they conducted their proceedings in private but then 
held public press briefings at the close of each day.72 All of this raised a sharp 
contrast to the closed proceedings that had produced the Meech Lake Accord.
Other factors prompted the federal government to initiate a national 
referendum. For one, Quebec had committed to holding a referendum on its future 
in Canada by October 1992; Canada’s national referendum on the Charlottetown 
Accord would satisfy that commitment in Quebec.73 Second, some provinces had 
passed their own laws requiring consultative provincial referenda prior to their 
legislatures ratifying a constitutional amendment.74 These provincial referenda 
66. “From the Backroom to the Front Line: Making Constitutional History or Encounters 
with the Constitution: Patriation, Meech Lake, and Charlottetown” (2012) 57:4 
McGill LJ 955 at 983.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid at 991-92.
69. Ibid at 993.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid at 994.
72. Ibid.
73. See also Laurence Morel, “The Rise of ‘Politically Obligatory’ Referendums: The 2005 French 
Referendum in Comparative Perspective” (2007) 30:5 W Eur Pol 1041 at 1048.
74. Ronald L Watts, “Processes of Constitutional Restructuring: The Canadian Experience in 
Comparative Context” (1999) Institute of Intergovernmental Relations Working Paper No 
1999/1 at 7, online: <www.queensu.ca/iigr/working-papers/archive/1999>.
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highlight a third factor: The federal government had calculated that holding its 
own nationwide referendum would allow it to exercise greater control over the 
administration of the referendum rather than leaving a matter of such high stakes 
to the vagaries of separate provincial political processes.75 Fourth, a successful 
national referendum approving the Charlottetown Accord would have prevented 
the agreement from unraveling slowly between its drafting and its ratification by 
the provinces, which is precisely what had happened to the Meech Lake Accord.76 
Each of these reasons suggests that holding a referendum was a politically 
expedient choice. One might well wonder whether the federal government’s 
decision to insert a consultative referendum into the process of constitutional 
amendment was driven instrumentally by political facts or by the government’s 
perception of, or belief in, the intrinsic value of popular participation.77 Indeed, 
Matthew Mendelsohn and Fred Cutler have observed that “Canadian political 
leaders had been coerced into holding a referendum and many observers felt that 
the political class was looking to orchestrate a response and seek legitimation, 
rather than engage in genuine consultation.”78 
Federal political actors were not constitutionally obliged to submit the 
Charlottetown amendment package to a national referendum. After all, there 
is no mention of referendal consultation or ratification in the Constitution’s 
formal amendment rules.79 The Constitution Act, 1982 creates five formal 
amendment thresholds, each requiring an escalating measure of federal or 
provincial legislative action, sometimes in tandem, with the applicable threshold 
rising in difficulty according to the functional or symbolic importance of the 
entrenched provision to be amended.80 For example, the Constitution requires 
a lower quantum of political agreement to amend a matter that is of interest 
only to the House of Commons than it does to amend a matter that concerns 
Canada’s federal institutions, including the monarchy, the Supreme Court, and 
75. Stephen Tierney, Constitutional Referendums: The Theory and Practice of Republican 
Deliberation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) at 141.
76. Lawrence LeDuc & Jon H Pammett, “Referendum Voting: Attitudes and Behaviour in the 
1992 Constitutional Referendum” (1995) 28:1 Can J Pol Sci 3 at 8.
77. On the former view, see Michael B Stein, “Improving the Process of Constitutional Reform 
in Canada: Lessons from the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Constitutional Rounds” 30:2 
Can J Pol Sci 307 at 327.
78. “The Effect of Referendums on Democratic Citizens: Information, Politicization, Efficacy 
and Tolerance” (2000) 30:4 Brit J Pol Sci 685 at 698.
79. See Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 8, ss 38-49.
80. See Richard Albert, “The Expressive Function of Constitutional Amendment Rules” (2013) 
59:2 McGill LJ 225 at 247-51 [Albert, “Expressive Function”].
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the Senate.81 This reflects a hierarchy of constitutional importance: The quantum 
of political agreement rises according to the importance assigned to the matter 
to be amended.82
These five formal amendment thresholds thus increase in difficulty. Under 
the unilateral provincial amendment power, a provincial assembly may amend 
its own provincial constitution simply by passing a law.83 The unilateral federal 
amendment power confers an analogous power upon Parliament in respect of 
purely federal matters.84 Under the regional amendment power, both houses 
of Parliament and the assemblies of the affected province(s) must agree to an 
amendment that will affect some, but not all, provinces.85 The general multilateral 
amendment power requires both houses of Parliament and two-thirds of 
provincial assemblies representing half of the total provincial population to agree 
to an amendment on various matters of national scope.86 And the unanimous 
amendment power requires the agreement of both houses of Parliament and each 
of the provincial assemblies to amend Canada’s most important institutions, 
principles, and constitutional provisions.87 None of these five rules requires or 
even mentions a referendum.
Nor did the federal Referendum Act make a consultative referendum on the 
Charlottetown Accord compulsory.88 Political actors made a strategic choice to 
hold a referendum. History at the time was similarly conclusive that the use of 
a referendum was neither a necessary nor a prudent step, as there had been no 
established practice of national referenda.89 Yet the referendum became virtually 
politically imperative as a tool of legitimation after the failure of the elite-led and 
closed-door negotiations for the Meech Lake Accord.
81. See Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 8, s 44 (authorizing Parliament to amend its internal 
constitution). Compare ibid, ss 38, 41-43 (authorizing Parliament and provincial assemblies 
to agree to amendments to matters affecting provinces and the federal government).
82. Richard Albert, “The Structure of Constitutional Amendment Rules” (2014) 49:4 Wake 
Forest L Rev 913 at 962-63.
83. Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 8, s 45.
84. Ibid, s 44.
85. Ibid, s 43.
86. Ibid, s 38(1).
87. Ibid, s 41.
88. See Referendum Act, supra note 52.
89. Prior to the 1992 consultative referendum on the Charlottetown Accord, there had been 
only two national referenda, one in 1898 on alcohol prohibition and the other in 1942 on 
war conscription. See Benoit Dostie & Ruth Dupré, “‘The People’s Will’: Canadians and the 
1898 Referendum on Alcohol Prohibition” (2012) 49:4 Explorations Econ Hist 498 at 499.
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II. PRECEDENT AND CONVENTION IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENT
The Charlottetown referendum was therefore thought to be a necessary 
innovation to supplement the codified rules of formal amendment. Of course, 
it is not unusual for political practice to depart from the constitutional text, 
particularly in Canada, where the written constitution does not always reflect 
the living constitution.90 Indeed, it is accepted in Canada that a disjunction 
can emerge between the written and unwritten parts of the Constitution, the 
former entrenching a provision that the latter no longer recognizes as valid.91 
This disjunction is only one way that written constitutions commonly change 
informally over time as political actors alter their behaviour and in turn also 
the social facts underlying the constitution. Accordingly, it does not pose a 
problem for constitutional theory to recognize that the written constitution 
must be interpreted in light of unwritten principles.92 Yet the susceptibility of 
the Constitution of Canada to informal changes like these raises a question 
worth asking: Has the Charlottetown innovation matured into a constitutional 
convention that today binds federal political actors, even though holding a 
referendum appears to defy the formal amendment rules entrenched in the text 
of the Constitution of Canada?
A. THE CHARLOTTETOWN INNOVATION: PRECEDENT OR CONVENTION?
Commentators have suggested that the Charlottetown innovation has created 
an expectation of direct popular participation requiring national referendal 
90. This point is particularly relevant to provincial secession. See Donna Greschner, “The Quebec 
Secession Reference: Goodbye to Part V?” (1998) 10:1 Const Forum Const 19 at 23.
91. See e.g. David E Smith, The Invisible Crown: The First Principle of Canadian Government, 
revised ed (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013) at 43; Allan C Hutchinson, 
“Constitutional Change and Constitutional Amendment: A Canadian Conundrum” in 
Xenophon Contiades, ed, Engineering Constitutional Change: A Comparative Perspective 
on Europe, Canada and the USA (New York: Routledge, 2013) 51 at 61-62; Albert, 
“Constitutional Desuetude,” supra note 4 at 650-73; Richard Albert, “Constitutional Disuse 
or Desuetude: The Case of Article V” (2014) 94:3 BU L Rev 1029 at 1072-79; Martha 
A Field, “The Differing Federalisms of Canada and the United States” (1992) 55:1 L & 
Contemp Probs 107 at 118.
92. See Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217 at paras 49-54, 161 DLR (4th) 385 
[Secession Reference].
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consultation for future major constitutional reforms.93 One observer states the 
point directly in terms of precedent: “The [Charlottetown] referendum created a 
precedent: Canadians must be consulted directly before political leaders attempt 
to alter the country’s basic document.”94 The Charlottetown referendum, it is 
said, “marks the end of the era of élite accommodation in matters constitutional 
and the beginning of a new era of public consultation and ratification.”95 
Therefore, any process that fails to consult the public through a referendum “is 
likely to be perceived as illegitimate.”96
On this majority view, the lesson of the failed Charlottetown Accord 
is that Canadians now perceive the Charlottetown innovation as a binding 
precedent and that it is no longer possible for political actors to approve major 
constitutional reforms through provincial legislatures alone.97 The referendum is 
“a fact of constitutional reform in Canada now,” the majority view continues, and 
although minor constitutional amendments would not require a referendum, 
major constitutional reforms “will most likely require public ratification.”98 
Commentators therefore regard the Charlottetown referendum as a precedent 
that future political actors must follow.
93. See e.g. Dawson, supra note 66 at 997; Peter Leslie, “Canada: The Supreme Court Sets 
Rules for the Secession of Quebec” (1999) 29:2 Publius 135 at 142; Kenneth McRoberts, 
“After the Referendum: Canada With or Without Quebec” in Kenneth McRoberts, ed, 
Beyond Quebec: Taking Stock of Canada (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
1995) 403 at 413; Matthew Mendelsohn, “Public Brokerage: Constitutional Reform and 
the Accommodation of Mass Publics” (2000) 33:2 Can J Pol Sci 245 at 251-52; Christa 
Scholtz, “Aboriginal Communities and the Charlottetown Accord: A Preliminary Analysis of 
Voting Returns” (Paper delivered at the Canadian Political Science Association 80th Annual 
Conference, University of British Columbia, 4 June 2008) at 14, online: <www.cpsa-acsp.
ca/papers-2008/Scholtz.pdf>; Robert C Vipond, “Seeing Canada Through the Referendum: 
Still a House Divided” (1993) 23:3 Publius 39 at 54; José Woehrling, “La modification par 
convention constitutionnelle du mode de désignation des sénateurs canadiens” (2008-09) 39 
RDUS 115 at 125.
94. Jeffrey Simpson, “The Referendum and Its Aftermath” in Kenneth McRoberts & Patrick J 
Monahan, eds, The Charlottetown Accord, the Referendum, and the Future of Canada (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1993) 193 at 193.
95. Michael Adams, “The October 1992 Canadian Constitutional Referendum: The 
Socio-Political Context” in McRoberts & Monahan, supra note 94, 185 at 192.
96. R Kent Weaver, “Political Institutions and Conflict Management in Canada” (1995) 538 
Annals Am Ac Pol & Soc Sci 54 at 65.
97. Roger Gibbins & David Thomas, “Ten Lessons from the Referendum” (1992) 15:4 Can 
Parliamentary Rev 3 at 3.
98. Kathy L Brock, “Learning from Failure: Lessons from Charlottetown” (1993) 4:2 Const 
Forum Const 29 at 32.
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The minority view, in contrast, suggests that the Charlottetown referendum 
is not binding. For example, Benoît Pelletier speaks of “the 1992 precedent of the 
Charlottetown agreement, that suggests that a Canada-wide referendum be held 
for constitutional reform, a precedent which, for the time being, cannot, strictly 
speaking, be considered a constitutional convention.”99 And, in a short paragraph, 
Peter Meekison also seems to reject the majority view. Meekison argues that the 
Charlottetown experience was less about the centrality of referendal consultation 
itself than about the importance of facilitating some measure of popular 
involvement in future constitutional negotiations, though not necessarily in the 
form of a referendum.100 
Neither the majority nor the minority view has been developed in any 
extensive detail, and the minority view is the least developed of the two. More 
importantly, as I will explain, neither view is correct because we cannot yet know 
whether the Charlottetown referendum is binding and moreover whether it has 
matured into a convention. We can, however, explore the question and project the 
circumstances that would tell us when and how to recognize that a convention has 
taken root. The first step in determining whether the Charlottetown referendum 
is binding on federal political actors requires us to distinguish between precedent 
and convention—because the difference between the two concepts holds the 
answer to whether political actors must once again hold a national consultative 
referendum in the next round of constitutional reform.
Whether the Charlottetown referendum has created either a precedent or a 
convention is difficult to know without a standard against which to judge how 
a practice matures into a convention. Fortunately, we can turn to an important 
illustration from Canadian constitutional history to understand how a practice 
becomes a convention. Prior to the Constitution Act, 1982, there was a convention 
of provincial consent to major constitutional reforms. The practice of provincial 
consultation eventually matured into a convention of provincial consent and, 
although the convention later became entrenched in the constitutional text, we 
may draw from this example in comparative perspective to explore whether the 
Charlottetown innovation has created a federal convention requiring national 
referendal consultation in major constitutional reforms in Canada. 
99. “Reinventing Canada: The Challenges that Canada Faces in the Twenty-First Century” 
(2010) 4:2 J Parliamentary & Pol L 133 at 142.
100. “Canada’s Quest for Constitutional Perfection” (1993) 4:2 Const Forum Const 55 at 56.
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B. FORMAL AMENDMENT AT CONFEDERATION 
Canada’s first codified constitution did not entrench a formal federal amendment 
rule.101 The formal amendment power belonged to the Parliament of the United 
Kingdom, which retained the exclusive authority to amend the Constitution Act, 
1867, a colonial law that reflected its colonial qualities.102 The only exception 
concerned provincial constitutions: The Constitution Act, 1867 conferred upon 
provinces the unilateral power to amend their provincial constitution.103 Over 
time, Canadian political actors came to expect the United Kingdom to pass an 
amendment only if it could claim broad support across Canada.104 As a matter of 
law, any formal amendment would begin and end in the United Kingdom, but as 
a matter of political reality, the process began in Canada with a joint resolution of 
the House of Commons and the Senate requesting an amendment.105 Before long, 
the United Kingdom would routinely agree to formally amend the Constitution 
of Canada in the manner requested by the joint resolution issued from Canada.106
The problem arose in 1949 when the United Kingdom amended the 
Constitution, at Canada’s request, to confer upon the Canadian Parliament a 
similar unilateral amendment authority over purely federal subjects—a power 
the provinces already possessed over provincial subjects in their own provincial 
constitutions.107 The provinces worried this new amendment would embolden 
the Canadian Parliament to exploit its unilateral amendment power on federal 
subjects to amend federal institutions of provincial concern without provincial 
consent.108 This was an understandable concern. The textual silence left it 
unclear whether the federal government was obligated even to consult with, 
let alone obtain the consent of, the provinces (and if yes, of how many) before 
requesting from the Parliament of the United Kingdom a major constitutional 
101. Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 6.
102. Peter W Hogg, “Constitutional Reform in Canada: A Comment on the Canadian 
Constitutional Crisis” (1980) 6:2 Yale Stud World Pub Ord 285 at 287-88.
103. Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 6, s 92.
104. William Renwick Riddell, “Constitutional Amendments in Canada” (1919) 28:4 
Yale LJ 314 at 317.
105. William R Lederman, “Canadian Constitutional Amending Procedures: 1867-1982” (1984) 
32:2 Am J Comp L 339 at 340.
106. Ibid; HB Mayo, “Majority Rule and the Constitution in Canada and the United States” 
(1957) 10:1 West Pol Q 49 at 59.
107. British North America (No 2) Act, 1949 (UK), 12, 13 & 14 Geo VI, c 81.
108. WR Lederman, “Notes on Recent Canadian Constitutional Developments” (1950) 32:3-4 J 
Comp Legis & Int’l L (3d) 74 at 75-76.
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amendment affecting the basic federal structure of the Constitution of Canada.109 
The constitutional text did not entrench any formal amendment rule that 
answered this question.
Political practice, however, evolved over time to suggest that the Canadian 
Parliament would not seek an amendment affecting federal-provincial relations 
without the federal government first consulting with and obtaining the approval 
of the provinces. Of the sixteen instances of formal amendment between 
Confederation and 1964, ten amendments had concerned matters that were 
exclusively federal in nature according to the federal government and therefore 
did not require provincial consultation.110 As to the six amendments affecting 
federal-provincial relations, the federal government consulted with the affected 
provinces in each instance: One amendment involved consultation only with the 
provinces affected by it, and in all but one of the remaining five cases the federal 
government secured unanimous provincial consent.111 This federal practice of 
seeking provincial approval for an amendment affecting federal-provincial 
relations appeared to evolve over time into something more than a practice. 
Indeed, in each of the unsuccessful intergovernmental negotiations from 1964 to 
1980 on a new or revised constitution for Canada, the proposed rule for formally 
amending matters affecting federal-provincial relations reflected this practice of 
securing the consent of both federal and provincial governments to any major 
constitutional change.112
C. THE CONVENTION OF PROVINCIAL CONSENT 
These historical precedents raised the all-important question: Is securing 
provincial consent to amendments affecting federal-provincial relations a practice 
or a convention? The Supreme Court of Canada answered this question in the 
1981 Patriation Reference in connection with a constitutional challenge to the 
federal government’s intention to proceed without provincial consent and only 
with a joint resolution of both houses of the Parliament of Canada requesting 
from the United Kingdom a package of major constitutional reforms altering 
the basic federal structure of the Constitution of Canada.113 The specific question 
109. William S Livingston, “The Amending Power of the Canadian Parliament” (1951) 45:2 Am 
Pol Sci Rev 437 at 437-38.
110. Guy Favreau, The Amendment of the Constitution of Canada (Ottawa: Information of 
Canada, 1965) at 16.
111. Ibid at 12-16.
112. See Hurley, supra note 9 at 34-54.
113. Re: Resolution to amend the Constitution, [1981] 1 SCR 753, 11 Man R (2d) 1 [Patriation 
Reference cited to SCR].
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before the Court was whether a convention exists that the House of Commons 
and the Senate will not proceed unilaterally to affect major constitutional reform 
without first securing provincial agreement.114
The Court answered that there is indeed a convention of substantial 
provincial consent.115 Looking to history, the Court noted that federal and 
provincial governments had tried for decades to reach agreement on formal 
amendment rules for the Constitution of Canada, and although they had failed 
each time, the quantification of provincial consent had invariably remained a 
central question in their deliberations.116 This, for the Court, indicated “a clear 
recognition by all the governments concerned of the principle that a substantial 
degree of provincial consent is required.”117 But the Court left open the precise 
quantum of provincial consent required to respect the conventional requirement 
of provincial agreement. The Court declared only that “a substantial measure 
of provincial consent is required,” something more than the agreement of two 
provinces and something less than unanimous agreement.118 Anticipating the 
objection that a convention on provincial consent must reflect some specificity 
in order for political actors to operationalize it, the Court explained that major 
constitutional reform must be governed by flexible conventions until political 
actors finally manage to agree on the details of the formal amendment rules:
Nor can it be said that this lack of precision is such as to prevent the principle 
from acquiring the constitutional status of a conventional rule, If a consensus had 
emerged on the measure of provincial agreement, an amending formula would 
quickly have been enacted and we would no longer be in the realm of conventions. 
To demand as much precision as if this were the case and as if the rule were a legal 
one is tantamount to denying that this area of the Canadian constitution is capable 
of being governed by conventional rules.119
The Court’s answer prompted the federal government to reconsider its 
unilateralism and instead to convene multilateral discussions to negotiate the 
package of amendments that would later become the Constitution Act, 1982. 
Canada’s new constitutional text would entrench complex formal amendment 
rules that retained both federal and provincial unilateral powers of formal 
114. Ibid at 875.
115. Ibid at 904-05.
116. Ibid at 904.
117. Ibid at 904-05.
118. Ibid.
119. Ibid at 904 [emphasis in original].
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amendment over matters under their respective exclusive jurisdiction.120 Canada’s 
new formal amendment rules would also entrench the convention of provincial 
consent for major constitutional reform within a larger structure of escalating 
thresholds requiring a different quantum of provincial agreement depending on 
the importance of the matter of federal-provincial concern to be amended.121 
Amendments affecting one or more, but not all, provinces would require the 
consent of both houses of Parliament and of the affected province(s).122 Another 
class of amendments affecting all provinces would require the consent of both 
houses of Parliament as well as of at least seven provinces representing at least 
half of the population of all provinces.123 And yet another class of amendments 
affecting all provinces would require the consent of both houses of Parliament 
and of all provinces.124 These rules remain in force today, though not without 
some controversy.125
III. REFERENDAL CONSULTATION IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENT
The Court’s analysis in the Patriation Reference—specifically relating to how the 
federal government’s practice of consulting with provinces eventually matured 
into a convention—is instructive for evaluating whether a convention now exists 
that binds federal political actors to hold a national referendal consultation for 
major constitutional reforms in Canada. I pause here to stress the parameters 
of our inquiry into the existence of the convention: The question is whether a 
convention now exists that governs the conduct of federal political actors, not of 
provincial or territorial political actors, to hold a referendum to consult Canadians 
across the country on a proposed amendment or package of amendments to 
the basic structure of the Constitution. If such a convention exists, it would 
120. See Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 8, s 44 (authorizing the Parliament of Canada to 
amend matters relating to purely federal subjects). See also ibid, s 45 (authorizing provincial 
legislatures to amend matters relating to their own provincial constitution).
121. See Albert, “Expressive Function,” supra note 80 at 250.
122. Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 8, s 43.
123. Ibid, s 38.
124. Ibid, s 41.
125. Despite this intricate escalating structure of formal amendment, there remain unresolved 
questions about which particular amendment rule governs specific kinds of amendment. 
See Reference re Senate Reform, 2014 SCC 32, [2014] 1 SCR 704 [Senate Reform Reference]. 
Moreover, Quebec was not a signatory to the new constitution and has yet to ratify it. See 
Michel Seymour, “Quebec and Canada at the Crossroads: A Nation Within a Nation” (2000) 
6:2 Nations & Nationalism 227 at 248.
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presumably have consequences for the conduct of provincial and territorial 
political actors. Their conduct would be driven by the conduct of federal political 
actors, whose own conduct would be governed by this convention.
The Court is a critical actor for identifying the existence of a constitutional 
convention. As H.L.A. Hart explained, the most relevant community for 
recognizing the binding quality of a rule is the legal elite, by which he meant 
judges.126 Of course, judges take action both in support of and in response 
to popular will, but it falls to political actors to choose what to recognize as 
valid and what conduct to credit. Hart understood a convention as a “shared 
acceptance,”127 a guiding norm that need not be stated but that is perceived by 
political actors as valid.128 A convention, therefore, exercises a regulatory function 
on political actors: It regulates their conduct and expectations by creating a body 
of common understandings, habits, and practices.129
A. CONVENTIONS IN CANADIAN COURTS
Canadian Courts will not enforce conventions, but they will recognize them as 
the Supreme Court did in the Patriation Reference.130 The Court gave four reasons 
why it would not enforce them: (1) conventions are not statutory rules that 
courts ordinarily interpret and apply; (2) conventions are rooted in precedents 
established by political actors, not in judicial precedents like common law rules; 
(3) the legal system does not contemplate any formal sanction for breaching 
conventions because sanctions, if any are to follow, would be political, not legal; 
and (4) conventions are by nature often in conflict with legal rules that courts 
are bound to enforce.131 This tension between convention and law “prevents 
the courts from enforcing conventions [and] also prevents conventions from 
crystallizing into laws, unless it be by statutory adoption.”132 
Courts will nonetheless recognize conventions. Given that the main purpose 
of a convention is “to ensure that the legal framework of the constitution will 
be operated in accordance with the prevailing constitutional values or principles 
126. The Concept of Law, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) at 256.
127. Ibid at 102.
128. Ibid at 101.
129. AV Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, revised ed (Indianapolis: 
Liberty Classics, 1982) at cxli.
130. Whether Canadian courts should recognize conventions is, of course, a controversial question. 
See Eugene A Forsey, “The Courts and the Conventions of the Constitution” (1984) 33 
UNBLJ 11 at 38-42.
131. Patriation Reference, supra note 113 at 880-81.
132. Ibid at 882.
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of the period,”133 a convention forms an integral if unwritten part of a regime’s 
constitution and may sometimes be even more important than its laws.134 The 
Court observed in the Patriation Reference that this is uncontroversially true 
in Canada insofar as the preamble of the Constitution Act, 1867 highlights 
the centrality of conventions to the constitutional system.135 The Court was 
right to note that conventions operate against the backdrop of the prevailing 
constitutional values of the period because conventions are not fixed points. They 
are neither eternal nor unconditional. They may be overridden by sustained 
contrary practice or, short of reversal, they may evolve either predictably or 
unpredictably as political actors alter their own practices.136 Yet despite their 
unwritten character and their non-enforceability in courts, conventions reflect 
a certain empirical simplicity because they “ultimately reflect what people do.”137 
Identifying a convention requires more than counting occurrences of a practice, 
however. In the Patriation Reference, the Court relied on Ivor Jennings’s three-part 
test to evaluate whether the federal government was bound by a convention of 
securing substantial provincial consent for fundamental constitutional change 
where federal-provincial interests are engaged.138 To establish that a convention 
exists, Jennings explained, “We have to ask ourselves three questions: first, what 
are the precedents; secondly, did the actors in the precedents believe that they 
were bound by a rule; and thirdly, is there a reason for the rule?”139 The Court 
determined that political actors had established a precedent of securing provincial 
consent, and thereafter had continued to follow the precedent for decades.140 But 
the Court noted that political actors followed the rule for a reason, not out of 
133. Ibid at 880.
134. Ibid at 883.
135. Ibid at 883-84.
136. Geoffrey Marshall, Constitutional Conventions: The Rules and Forms of Political Accountability, 
revised ed (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986) at 217.
137. Ibid. In this respect, conventions are stable insofar as they are rooted in the predictable 
practices of political actors. Yet conventions are also changeable by the very political actors 
whose conduct determines whether or not a convention has matured.
138. Patriation Reference, supra note 113 at 888.
139. Ivor Jennings, The Law and the Constitution, 5th ed (London: University of London Press, 
1961) at 136. An important critique of the Jennings test argues that conventions may 
arise variously from precedential practice, by agreement without prior precedent, from an 
authoritative unilateral declaration by important political actors, and from constitutional 
principle. See Andrew Heard, “Constitutional Conventions: The Heart of the Living 
Constitution” (2012) 6:2 J Parliamentary & Pol L 319 at 332-37. While I acknowledge 
the critique, I nonetheless apply the Jennings test because it remains, at least for now, the 
conventional method to evaluate whether a practice has matured into a convention.
140. Patriation Reference, supra note 113 at 888-94.
(2016) 53 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL422
convenience or habit: Securing provincial consent was consistent with and indeed 
necessitated by Canada’s federal character.141 The Court also observed that, for 
any constitutional change affecting federal-provincial relations, “[t]he federal 
principle cannot be reconciled with a state of affairs where the modification of 
provincial legislative powers could be obtained by the unilateral action of the 
federal authorities.”142
B. THE LAW AND POLITICS OF REFERENDA IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENT
The three-part Jennings test provides a framework to evaluate whether there is 
a convention that binds federal actors to hold a national referendum on future 
reforms to the basic structure of the Constitution of Canada. The answer to 
Jennings’s first question—whether there are precedents—risks being obscured 
by insufficient specificity as to the precise practice for which we must identify 
precedents. Whether there are any precedents in Canada on holding referenda is 
not the right question to ask, nor is whether there are precedents of the federal 
government holding referenda. Examining the history of referenda in Canada 
yields the perception that referenda are common occurrences.143 The federal 
government has administered three referenda over the years,144 and provinces and 
territories have held dozens of referenda of their own on subjects as varied as 
women’s suffrage, public health insurance, balanced budget legislation, daylight 
savings time, and electoral recall.145 Yet this long record of referenda in Canada is 
not relevant to the essential focus of the first question in the Jennings test. That 
question can be answered only by asking whether there are precedents on holding 
national referenda on constitutional amendment. On this point, Canadian 
141. Ibid at 905-09.
142. Ibid at 905-06.
143. The question of Quebec sovereignty, which has been tested in two referenda since 1980, 
further strengthens the perception of frequent referenda in Canada. See Le Directeur général 
des élections du Québec, “Référendums au Québec,” online: <www.electionsquebec.qc.ca/
francais/tableaux/referendums-quebec-8484.php>.
144. See Elizabeth Goodyear-Grant & Cameron Anderson, “Public Support for Direct 
Democracy in Canada: The ‘Post-Charlottetown’ Era and Beyond” (Paper delivered at the 
Canadian Political Science Association 76th Annual Meeting, University of Manitoba, 4 June 
2004) at 2-3, online: <www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2004/Goodyear-Grant-Anderson.pdf>.
145. See Patrick Boyer, Direct Democracy: The History and Future of Referendums (Toronto: 
Dundurn Press, 1996) at 190-222, 259-60.
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history is clear: The Charlottetown innovation is the only instance of national 
referendal consultation relating to a constitutional amendment.146
1. THE RELEVANT PRECEDENTS
That there is only one prior instance of national referendal consultation would 
seem to foreclose the possibility of a convention. Jennings, after all, insisted that 
political actors are not bound to act in a certain way simply because they may 
have once in the past behaved in a particular way.147 The search for precedent to 
support the existence of a convention generally requires more than one instance 
of a particular conduct, although Jennings did concede that “[a] single precedent 
with a good reason may be enough to establish the rule.”148 This is not to suggest 
that a string of precedents on its own is enough to create a convention that 
will govern the conduct of political actors. For Jennings, one occurrence is not 
enough, but neither is a series of identical occurrences. Mere practice, as Jennings 
writes, is insufficient on its own to establish a convention: “The fact that an 
authority has always behaved in a certain way is no warrant for saying that it 
ought to behave in that way.”149 Creating a convention turns on something more 
than the frequency of occurrences.
Yet the Charlottetown innovation is not the only relevant precedent. As 
Andrew Heard observes, the first part of the Jennings test leaves unanswered 
whether one should consider both positive and negative precedents.150 This is 
an important question, according to Heard, because “[s]ometimes, what did 
not happen and why can be just as revealing, or even more so, than what has 
happened.”151 We should therefore also look for negative precedents on the use of 
referenda in constitutional amendment, specifically for occasions where political 
actors have rejected the use of referenda in constitutional amendment. There is 
indeed one such important negative precedent.
The negative precedent dates to 1980, when the federal government 
prepared a joint resolution for both houses of Parliament to unilaterally patriate 
146. See Daniel Turp, “Solutions to the Future of Canada and Québec after the October 26th 
Referendum: Genuine Sovereignties within a Novel Union” (1993) 4:2 Const Forum 
Const 47 at 47.
147. Jennings, supra note 139 at 135.
148. Ibid at 136.
149. Ibid at 134-35.
150. Canadian Constitutional Conventions: The Marriage of Law & Politics, 2nd ed (Don Mills, 
ON: Oxford University Press Canada, 2014) at 14 [Heard, “Constitutional Conventions”].
151. Ibid.
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the Constitution of Canada.152 The joint resolution proposed a package of 
amendments on a multiplicity of matters, but none was more controversial than 
the proposed formal amendment rules. The joint resolution created two general 
amendment procedures. The first authorized an amendment by resolutions from 
both houses of Parliament as well as a majority of provincial legislatures meeting 
specific quorum requirements by population and geography.153 The second 
general amendment procedure authorized an amendment by a referendum 
proposed by both houses of Parliament and ratified by a majority of participating 
voters, including a majority of voters in a specific geographical distribution of 
provinces across western, central, and eastern Canada.154 The joint resolution 
therefore proposed to give the Parliament of Canada the option of pursuing a 
general amendment to the Constitution of Canada either via provincial legislative 
ratification or referendal ratification. These were alternative paths to achieve 
major constitutional change.
Despite the federal government’s initial insistence that it would stand firm 
behind preserving the referendum option,155 the proposal to entrench an option 
of referendal ratification in the formal amendment process did not survive the 
patriation negotiations,156 and ultimately led to the Patriation Reference.157 The 
proposal for referendal ratification in constitutional amendment was unusual 
given that it had never been discussed at a federal-provincial conference or more 
generally in the country.158 It was a “radically new”159 device in constitutional 
amendment. The Official Opposition denounced the referendum option as 
contrary to Canada’s structure of government, which it viewed as anchored in 
the separation of powers between federal and provincial governments.160 The 
Opposition argued that the federal government was “trying to change that 
division by having constitutional amendments approved by referendum, rather 
152. See Government of Canada, “Proposed Resolution for a Joint Address to Her Majesty the 
Queen respecting the Constitution of Canada” Document 25005-2-10-80 (2 October 1980).
153. Ibid, s 45.
154. Ibid, s 46.
155. See John Ferguson, “PM Won’t Budge on BNA Proposal to End Deadlocks with 
Referendum,” The Globe and Mail (17 October 1980) 1.
156. See generally David Close, “Politics and Constitutional Reform in Canada: A Study in 
Political Opposition” (1985) 15:1 Publius 161 at 167-68.
157. See Patriation Reference, supra note 113 at 765–67.
158. Richard Simeon, “An Overview of the Trudeau Constitutional Proposals” (1981) 19:3 Alta L 
Rev 391 at 392-93.
159. Jake Epp, “It’s Not Just Another Flag Debate, Tory MP Says in Rejecting Proposal,” The 
Globe and Mail (18 February 1981) 10.
160. Geoffrey Stevens, “A Rude Shock,” The Globe and Mail (21 October 1980) 6.
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than provincial legislatures.”161 Opponents worried that the referendum option 
could lead to “the tyranny of the 51 per cent majority”162 and were reluctant to 
support it because it “rais[ed] a constant threat that the federal Government will 
go it alone on future amendments.”163
The provinces rejected the referendum proposal for several reasons. It would 
have given the federal government the option of seeking to ratify an amendment 
by national referendum even where the provincial governments had withheld 
their consent to the amendment.164 No other proposal drew greater resistance 
from provinces.165 Provinces worried that the federal government would use 
referenda to marginalize them.166 In an editorial, a leading national newspaper 
observed that the referendum option would allow the federal government to 
“ride roughshod over the Legislatures.”167 The referendum proposal was seen as an 
anti-provincial federal “weapon … for use in overcoming provincial opposition 
to substantive constitutional amendments.”168 There was one further reason to 
oppose the referendum option: Referenda, opponents argued at the time, could 
exacerbate the existing regional divisions in Canada by highlighting them in the 
results of the referendum. Saskatchewan Premier Allan Blakeney thus argued 
that “the whole idea of a referendum as a way to weld this country more closely 
together when the regional pulls are strong is ill-conceived.”169 The failure of 
this proposal is an important negative precedent that weighs against seeing the 
referendum as a conventional requirement.
2. SELF-PERCEPTION AND BINDING RULES
The second inquiry in the three-part Jennings test informs the first: Do political 
actors feel bound by the precedents? Just as the first inquiry must be framed at the 
161. Ibid.
162. John Gray, “Lawrence Volunteers to Advise the Queen on Patriation Plans,” The Globe and 
Mail (8 October 1980) 3 (quoting Jake Epp, then a Member of Parliament).
163. Robert Sheppard, “Referendums: Sticking Point at Centre of BNA Controversy,” The Globe 
and Mail (18 November 1980) 9.
164. See Jeff Sallot, “Blakeney Sees Hope for Scaled-Down Package,” The Globe and Mail (25 
February 1981) 8.
165. Alan C Cairns, “Citizens (Outsiders) and Governments (Insiders) in Constitution-Making: 
The Case of Meech Lake” (1988) 14 (supp) Can Pub Pol’y S121 at S143.
166. JR Mallory, “Conflict Management in the Canadian Federal System” (1981) 44:3 Law & 
Contemp Probs 231 at 242.
167. “What He Didn’t Mention,” Editorial, The Globe and Mail (30 December 1980) 6.
168. “Britain and Canada,” Editorial, The Globe and Mail (5 November 1980) 6.
169. “Saskatchewan Dashes Trudeau’s Last Chance for an Ally in the West,” The Globe and Mail 
(20 February 1981) 10.
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lowest level of abstraction in order to isolate the nub of the matter—whether there 
is a federal convention of national referendal consultation in major constitutional 
reform—this second inquiry must similarly be framed with specificity so as 
not to elide important distinctions. It is important to recall that if a national 
consultation like the Charlottetown referendum were to occur in the future, it 
would be ordered, controlled and administered by the Parliament of Canada, 
the federal government and federal institutions.170 Consequently, it matters less 
whether provincial or territorial political actors feel bound by the Charlottetown 
precedent than whether federal political actors feel bound by it. The point is not 
that provincial referenda are irrelevant to major constitutional reform. Indeed, 
as I suggest below, provincial referenda may ultimately be directly relevant to 
the formation of a convention on national referendal consultation. But we must 
focus first on whether federal actors feel bound by the Charlottetown innovation 
because our inquiry is concerned only with whether there is a federal convention 
of national referendal consultation.
Focusing on whether provincial or territorial political actors are bound by 
a convention of referendal consultation would distort the inquiry because many 
provinces and territories have enacted laws that require referendal consultation, 
with some requiring binding ratification before approving an amendment to the 
Constitution of Canada. For instance, Alberta’s Constitutional Referendum Act 
requires a provincial referendum “before a resolution authorizing an amendment 
to the Constitution of Canada is voted on by the Legislative Assembly.”171 
By provincial law, the result of the provincial referendum is binding on the 
government that initiated the referendum.172 
British Columbia’s Constitutional Amendment Approval Act and its Referendum 
Act likewise stipulate, respectively, that “[t]he government must not introduce a 
motion for a resolution of the Legislative Assembly authorizing an amendment 
to the Constitution of Canada unless a referendum has first been conducted 
under the Referendum Act with respect to the subject matter of that resolution”173 
and that the referendum result “is binding on the government that initiated the 
referendum.”174 Other provinces and territories authorize but do not require their 
governments to hold referenda. Some of these referendal laws make the results of 
170. See “A Charter of Loopholes,” Editorial, The Globe and Mail (27 March 1981) 6.
171. Alberta Referendum Act, supra note 56, s 2(1).
172. Ibid, s 4.
173. Constitutional Amendment Approval Act, supra note 56, s 1.
174. BC Referendum Act, supra note 56, s 4.
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referenda binding on the provincial or territorial government175 whereas others 
make them simply advisory.176 Some provincial and territorial political actors 
are therefore constrained by law.177 These various provincial and territorial laws 
may by accumulation eventually force the creation of a national standard for 
referendal consultation, in which case federal actors would be acting in response 
to pressure coming from the provinces and territories. For their part, provincial 
and territorial actors would remain bound by their respective laws.
There are no similar laws requiring federal political actors to consult Canadians 
in a referendum before proposing a constitutional amendment to the basic 
structure of the Constitution of Canada. The federal Referendum Act authorizes 
the federal government to hold a referendum in connection with a constitutional 
amendment, but it does not make referendal consultation compulsory. The law 
instead confers broad discretionary authority upon the federal government to 
hold one should it be in the “public interest.”178 In light of the limited scope 
of the Referendum Act, Canada’s formal amendment rules evidently reflect the 
entire codification of the binding rules of amendment. Yet the question remains 
whether there are any unwritten rules for formal amendment, namely a federal 
convention on national referendal consultation.179 Were federal political actors 
to feel bound by the Charlottetown precedent, this would suggest that they 
had come to believe that adhering to the Constitution of Canada’s textually 
entrenched procedures for formal amendment was a necessary though insufficient 
175. See Referendum Act, SNB 2011, c 23, ss 12-13 (establishing quorum requirement for binding 
government); The Referendum and Plebiscite Act, SS 1990-91, c R-8.01, s 4 (establishing 
quorum and threshold requirements for binding government); Public Government Act, 
SY 1992, c 10, s 7 (authorizing legislature to decide ex ante whether referendum will 
bind government).
176. See e.g. Consolidation of Plebiscite Act, RSNWT 1988, c P-8, s 5; Nunavut Act, SC 1993, 
c 28, s 29; Elections and Plebiscites Act, SNWT 2006, c 15, s 48; Loi sur la consultation 
populaire, RLRQ, c C-64.1, s 7; Plebiscites Act, RSPEI 1988, c P-10, s 1. See also Elections 
Act, SNL 1992, c E-3.1, s 218 (authorizing a non-binding plebiscite on amendments to the 
Constitution of Canada).
177. There are two other noteworthy examples of provincial referendal legislation but neither 
requires a binding referendum in connection with an amendment to the Constitution of 
Canada. In Manitoba, certain proposed tax increases must first be approved by the electorate 
in a referendum. See The Balanced Budget, Fiscal Management and Taxpayer Accountability 
Act, SM 2008, c 44, CCSM c B5, s 10. In Nova Scotia, the province may not sell liquor 
unless the municipality in which the province proposes to sell liquor grants its approval. See 
Liquor Control Act, RSNS 1989, c 260, ss 43-46.
178. See Referendum Act, supra note 52, s 3(1).
179. Elsewhere, I have explored the unwritten rules of formal amendment in Canada. See Albert, 
“Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment,” supra note 26 at 170-73.
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condition for achieving major constitutional reform. The rule of recognition 
would have compelled them to recognize the legitimacy-conferring function of 
national referendal consultation as an unwritten though obligatory prerequisite 
for formally amending the basic structure of the Constitution of Canada.
In light of Hart’s view that the most relevant community for recognizing the 
binding quality of a rule is the legal elite, it is worth inquiring into the Court’s 
view. This is not a dispositive point, but it is important and useful to consider. 
Had the Charlottetown innovation matured into a constitutional convention, it is 
possible though not inevitable that the Court would have acknowledged it when 
it issued its recent advisory opinion on constitutional reforms to the Senate.180 In 
the Patriation Reference, the Court, as discussed above,181 had recognized though 
not enforced the convention on substantial provincial agreement for amendments 
affecting federal-provincial relations.182 The Court’s advisory opinion on Senate 
reform was prompted by the government’s request for clarity on the amendment 
process required to, among other things, change the method of Senator selection, 
establish fixed terms of senatorial tenure, and abolish the Senate.183 
In the Senate Reform Reference, the Court invoked its earlier validation in 
the Patriation Reference of a convention requiring substantial provincial consent 
for amendments affecting federal-provincial relations,184 but it did not discuss 
referendal consultation. The Court did, however, explain that the Constitution 
Act, 1982 “provides the blueprint for how to amend the Constitution of Canada,” 
and that “It tells us what changes Parliament and the provincial legislatures 
can make unilaterally, what changes require substantial federal and provincial 
consent, and what changes require unanimous agreement.”185 The Court stressed 
that where constitutional amendment touches upon Canada’s federal structure, 
the Constitution Act, 1982 requires approval from the Parliament of Canada and 
a significant representation of provinces.186 The Court examined each of the 
five procedures for formally amending the Constitution of Canada under the 
Constitution Act, 1982’s escalating amendment framework, but in no case did it 
suggest that those procedures were insufficient for a formal amendment.187 
180. Senate Reform Reference, supra note 125.
181. See Section III(A), above, for more on this point.
182. See discussion accompanying notes 115-19.
183. Senate Reform Reference, supra note 125 at para 5.
184. Ibid at para 29.
185. Ibid at para 28.
186. Ibid at para 29.
187. Ibid at paras 33-48.
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On the contrary, the Court interpreted those procedures as necessary 
and sufficient for their respective classes of formal amendments.188 The Court 
identified the scope of political consent required for each proposed constitutional 
amendment concerning the Senate. It confirmed that changing the method 
of Senator selection would require conformity with sections 38 and 42 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982, specifically the agreement of both houses of the Parliament 
of Canada as well as at least seven of the provinces representing at least half of 
the total population.189 The Court concluded that the same consent threshold in 
section 38 applies to formally amending Senate terms, for instance to impose fixed 
terms of service.190 With respect to the proposal to abolish the Senate, the Court 
observed that it “would fundamentally alter our constitutional architecture—by 
removing the bicameral form of government that gives shape to the Constitution 
Act, 1867,”191 suggesting that the amendment would profoundly change the 
Constitution of Canada. Yet even this most fundamental of formal amendments 
to the Constitution of Canada would not, for the Court, require referendal 
consultation. The Court declared that section 41’s unanimity procedure would 
govern Senate abolition, requiring the agreement of both houses of Parliament 
and each of the provincial legislatures.192 Therefore, the Court did not recognize 
the importance of referendal consultation.193 Again, I stress that this point is 
not dispositive, though it does raise a useful contrast to the Patriation Reference, 
where the Court recognized the existence of a convention.
The Court did, however, discuss the role of referenda in the Secession Reference. 
The Court acknowledged that referenda “appeal to some of the same principles 
that underlie the legitimacy of the Constitution itself, namely, democracy and 
self-government.”194 Moreover, the Court noted that referenda are an important 
tool for governance in constitutional democracy, but made it clear that the 
Constitution neither provides for their use nor gives them legal force:
Although the Constitution does not itself address the use of a referendum 
procedure, and the results of a referendum have no direct role or legal effect in 
our constitutional scheme, a referendum undoubtedly may provide a democratic 
188. Ibid.
189. Ibid at para 53.
190. Ibid at para 82.
191. Ibid at para 97.
192. Ibid at para 110.
193. On Hart’s view, this would be one strike against the existence of the convention, since the 
Court had failed to recognize the convention. See Hart, supra note 126 at 256.
194. Secession Reference, supra note 92 at para 75.
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method of ascertaining the views of the electorate on important political questions 
on a particular occasion.195
The Court suggested that political actors could allow themselves to be guided by 
a referendum result but emphasized that institutions of representative government 
must make the final choice. Political actors, the Court wrote, “may, of course, take 
their cue from a referendum, but in legal terms, constitution-making in Canada, 
as in many countries, is undertaken by the democratically elected representatives 
of the people.”196 For the Court, then, the Constitution is clear today in not 
requiring referendal ratification for constitutional amendments, major or not.
3. THE REASON FOR THE RULE
There remains the third part of the inquiry into whether a convention exists: Is 
there a reason for the rule?197 The answers to the first two parts of the inquiry 
may seem to obviate the need to answer the third, but Jennings cautioned care in 
applying his formula where only one precedent exists. “A single precedent with 
good reason,” stressed Jennings, “may be enough to establish the rule.”198 The 
reason for the Charlottetown innovation may therefore be sufficiently compelling 
so as to transform its single occurrence into a conventional rule that binds federal 
actors to hold a national referendum. Jennings offered little guidance on how to 
evaluate the sufficiency of the reason supporting the convention. He stated only 
that the creation of a convention “must be normative”199 and “must be due to the 
reason of the thing because it accords with the prevailing political philosophy.”200 
Jennings added that the creation of a convention “helps to make the democratic 
system operate; it enables the machinery of State to run more smoothly; and 
if it were not there friction would result.”201 Jennings appears to be privileging 
three factors in evaluating the sufficiency of the reason for the rule: normativity, 
consistency, and efficiency.
Normativity relates to the principle underlying the practice. There must be 
a principled reason for following a political practice, which later matures into a 
convention. The leading scholar of Canadian constitutional conventions, Andrew 
Heard, observes that absent a reason for adhering to a political practice, “the 
195. Ibid at para 87.
196. Ibid at para 88.
197. Jennings, supra note 139 at 136.
198. Ibid at 136.
199. Ibid at 135.
200. Ibid at 136.
201. Ibid.
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obligation could simply be one of conformity to tradition, policy preference,” 
or “mere habit.”202 These reasons for rule-following are insufficient to create a 
convention inasmuch as they are not supported by a governing principle that 
gives the reasons “any force as rules of constitutional morality.”203 Measuring 
the Charlottetown innovation against this factor does not yield a clear answer 
as to whether the normative justification for the practice is either satisfied or 
lacking. On one view, as discussed above,204 the Charlottetown precedent seems 
to have arisen for instrumental, not intrinsic, reasons. Political actors do not 
appear to have been motivated by a commitment to the intrinsic value of popular 
participation in major constitutional reform; they appear instead to have been 
motivated by political expediency.205 Yet, on another view, the instrumental 
motivation for holding the Charlottetown referendum could be understood 
to reflect a normative justification anchored in democratic legitimacy. Federal 
political actors, on this account, thought it necessary to respond to the call for 
more participatory forms of democracy in the aftermath of the failure of the 
Meech Lake Accord. Their solution, one of many possible options, was to hold a 
referendum, which they did of their own volition, not under duress.
Consistency and efficiency, however, appear lacking in our evaluation 
of the justification for the Charlottetown innovation. As discussed above,206 
Canada has no history of national referendal consultation in constitutional 
amendment, nor is there an overwhelming record in the country of national 
referendal consultation more generally. Indeed, there is an important and recent 
negative precedent suggesting that national referenda are a point of contention 
for provincial premiers.207 It is therefore difficult to support the argument that the 
Charlottetown innovation “accords with the prevailing political philosophy.”208 
With regard to efficiency—Jennings’s view that the practice must help the 
democratic system operate more smoothly209—if federal political actors were 
bound by a convention of national referendal consultation, this would only 
202. Heard, “Constitutional Conventions,” supra note 150 at 17.
203. Ibid.
204. See Section II(C), above, for more on this point.
205. Ibid.
206. See the text accompanying notes 143-46.
207. See the text accompanying notes 150-69.
208. Jennings, supra note 139 at 136.
209. Ibid.
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further complicate the already onerous multilateral amendment process for 
major constitutional reform.210
For now, one cannot state that there is a federal convention of national referendal 
consultation in major constitutional reform in Canada. The Charlottetown 
innovation is the only instance of referendal consultation for a constitutional 
amendment, and it is one of only three national referenda in Canadian history.211 
That provinces have a longer record of consultative referenda speaks to their 
local history and practices, not to the question whether a convention exists 
that binds federal political actors to hold a referendum on major constitutional 
reforms. The Court has not recognized the existence of such a convention, even 
when faced with a question directly related to the rules for major constitutional 
reform.212 The Court instead interpreted the formal amendment rules entrenched 
in the Constitution Act, 1982 as necessary and sufficient conditions for effecting 
changes to the basic structure of the Constitution of Canada.213 Moreover, the 
Charlottetown innovation seems, on one view, to be lacking in consistency and 
efficiency as well as in its normative foundation. The referendum appears to have 
been motivated by instrumental reasons in response to procedural deficiencies in 
connection with the Meech Lake Accord, not by intrinsic justifications related to 
the value of participatory democracy.214 Applying the Jennings test suggests, on 
balance, that a convention of federal referendal consultation does not yet exist.
Nonetheless to conclude today in the absence of concrete political facts 
that a convention of federal referendal consultation exists or not would be to 
misunderstand the nature of conventions. We cannot know whether federal 
political actors feel bound to conform their conduct to a precedent until federal 
210. Formal amendment in Canada is incredibly complex. See Katherine Swinton, “Amending 
the Canadian Constitution: Lessons From Meech Lake” (1992) 42:2 UTLJ 139 at 144. This 
is attributable partly to the federalization of constitutional politics. See Bettina Petersohn, 
“Constitutional Reform and Federal Dynamics: Causes and Effects” in Arthur Benz & Jörg 
Broschek, eds, Federal Dynamics: Continuity, Change, and the Varieties of Federalism (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013) 297 at 316. It is also due to the need for mass input and 
legitimation. See Lusztig, supra note 63 at 748. The difficulty of formal amendment in 
Canada is also exacerbated by the 1996 regional veto law, which effectively gives each of four 
provinces a veto in major constitutional reform under section 38 of the Constitution Act, 
1982. See Constitutional Amendments, SC 1996, c 1. See also Andrew Heard & Tim Swartz, 
“The Regional Veto Formula and Its Effects on Canada’s Constitutional Amendment Process” 
(1997) 30:2 Can J Pol Sci 339 at 351.
211. See Boyer, supra note 145 at 259.
212. See Senate Reform Reference, supra note 125 at paras 33-48.
213. See ibid.
214. See the text accompanying notes 65-89.
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political actors reach a decision point compelling a choice. Only then can we 
know if a convention has taken root. Evaluating whether or not a convention 
exists therefore entails both a theoretical inquiry, which I have sought to develop 
with reference to the Jennings test, and an empirical inquiry that requires a set 
of facts confronting federal political actors. When political actors in the future 
engage in constitutional reform amounting to mega constitutional politics, we 
will know that a federal convention on national referendal consultation exists if 
federal actors elect to submit their amendment proposals to a referendum.
It is not difficult, however, to imagine that future political actors would feel 
bound by the Charlottetown innovation. Should more provinces and territories 
adopt the Albertan and British Columbian model requiring their governments 
by law to hold a referendum prior to any action on a proposed amendment to 
the Constitution of Canada, an expectation of subnational referenda across the 
country could eventually emerge. As provinces and territories conducted these 
referenda, binding or not, and it became a norm of subnational government in 
Canada to consult citizens formally on whether to ratify a proposed amendment 
to the Constitution of Canada, the federal government, provinces, and territories 
might well agree that these consultative referenda are best conducted as a single 
national referendum. The referendum would be administered by the independent 
federal election agency under federal law, paid for with federal funds, and subject 
to national standards. What would impede this scenario is the continuing 
infrequency of major constitutional reform. In order for a federal convention 
on national referendal consultation to take root, there must be new major efforts 
to amend the Constitution. So far there have been none since the failure of the 
Charlottetown Accord, largely due to the political impossibility, perceived or real, 
of major constitutional reform initiatives in Canada.215
C. POPULAR CONSTITUTIONAL REDESIGN
We can interpret the impetus for referendal consultation in Canada in terms 
internal and altogether external to Canadian constitutional politics. On the 
internal account, the pressure currently building behind some form of popular 
participation in major constitutional reform in Canada is a response to the 
failure to give proper voice to the people in the process of patriation in 1981 and 
1982. On the external account, the pressure aligns with the larger trend in the 
democratic world towards some measure of popular participation in the design 
215. See David McLaughlin, Poisoned Chalice: The Last Campaign of the Progressive Conservative 
Party? (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1994) at 5-36 (discussing the costs to political careers of the 
failed Charlottetown Accord).
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and redesign of constitutions. Both are descriptive accounts, but they have deep 
normative foundations.
Consider the patriation of the Constitution. Rather than seeking to 
legitimate the new Constitution with the consent of Canadians in a national 
referendum, political actors ratified the Constitution among themselves in an 
act of executive federalism that left the people noticeably uninvolved in what 
should have been an act of popular, not elite, legitimation. Reflecting in 1984 
on Canada’s missed democratic moment, Bruce Ackerman and Robert Charney 
observed that Canada had “neither completely succeeded in adapting British 
parliamentary sovereignty nor fully domesticated American popular sovereignty 
to Canadian purposes,” and thus stood at “the constitutional crossroads”216 faced 
with many open questions crying out for resolution. None of those questions, 
noted Ackerman and Charney, was more important than whether Canadians 
would eventually give themselves their own constitution instead of accepting 
what elites had given them:
Perhaps a generation from now, after another exhausting series of referenda on the 
provincial and the federal level, both Anglophone and Francophone voters will 
approve a mutually satisfactory constitution, one that hands down the law to the 
parliaments of Canada in the name of We the People of Canada.217
Part of what Ackerman and Charney had envisioned came true. There was 
indeed a series of referenda within the next generation in connection with the 
Charlottetown Accord, but approval did not follow, nor did Canadians ever speak 
in one voice to adopt a constitution that bore their imprint of legitimation. On 
the contrary, the subsequent efforts at constitutional renewal reinforced many of 
the old fault lines around which patriation had occurred, and the failed attempts 
to revise the Constitution also created new divisions. Today, then, we remain at 
much the same constitutional crossroads where Ackerman and Charney found 
Canada thirty years ago. 
This crossroads is the same one that compelled Peter Russell to ask if 
Canadians could ever be a sovereign people.218 The question remains unanswered 
today. When the Court wrote in the Secession Reference that “[t]he Constitution 
is the expression of the sovereignty of the people of Canada,”219 it was speaking of 
the exercise of sovereignty in its mediated and metaphorical sense, not in its most 
meaningful sense of actual popular consent. The people of Canada have yet to 
216. “Canada at the Constitutional Crossroads” (1984) 34:1 UTLJ 117 at 133.
217. Ibid at 134.
218. Russell, supra note 21.
219. Secession Reference, supra note 92 at para 85.
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give their direct consent to the Constitution. This fact of Canadian constitutional 
life does not undermine the Constitution’s legal force, nor does it make the 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms any less of a symbol of Canadian identity than 
it has become, nor does it detract from the extraordinary global influence of the 
Canadian Constitution. But the Constitution’s missing democratic moment of 
popular consent does highlight its drought of sociological legitimacy.
The rise of provincial and territorial laws requiring some form of popular 
consultation prior to ratifying an amendment can therefore be understood as 
an effort to breathe into the Constitution the sociological legitimacy it has long 
lacked. A ratification referendum such as the one required by some provincial 
laws can serve a cluster of legitimacy-conferring functions: It makes citizens more 
likely to identify with the constitution, it makes the constitution-making process 
seem fair to the governed, and it helps instil a culture of citizenship oriented 
towards democratic norms of deliberation and participation.220 It will take more 
than a series of subnational referenda on major constitutional amendments to 
give the Constitution of Canada the popular legitimacy it requires in this modern 
era. Only an inclusive and informed national referendum on either a major 
constitutional amendment or a new constitution altogether can give Canada its 
needed democratic moment to finally legitimate the Constitution. 
Around the world, constitutional democracies are living their own democratic 
moments, even in places where referenda are not the norm. In the United 
Kingdom, for example, the paradigmatic, if declining, model of parliamentary 
sovereignty has not traditionally recognized referenda as a necessary part or 
sufficient form of constitutional change. But the prime minister’s decision to 
hold a referendum on the country’s future in the European Union reflected the 
larger trend around the world towards popular decision making, if only as a 
matter of consultation and not necessarily of binding commitment. The historic 
referendum vote in favour of leaving the Union has produced a major, though 
unwritten, constitutional change in the United Kingdom. While in recent years 
referenda have not always been used to ratify new constitutions—for instance, 
neither Tunisia in 2014221 nor Nepal in 2015222 ratified their constitutions by 
220. See Jeffrey A Lenowitz, “‘A Trust That Cannot Be Delegated’: The Invention of Ratification 
Referenda” (2015) 109:4 Am Pol Sci Rev 803 at 814.
221. See Carlotta Gall, “Three Years After Uprising, Tunisia Approves Constitution,” The New 
York Times (26 January 2014), online: <www.nytimes.com/2014/01/27/world/africa/
three-years-after-uprising-tunisia-approves-constitution.html>.
222. See Rishi Iyengar, “Nepal has Finally Passed a New Constitution After Years of 
Political Turmoil,” Time (17 September 2015), online: <time.com/4037788/
nepal-constitution-sushil-koirala-protests-madhesi-tharu>.
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referendum—they have been used to adopt new constitutions in Iraq (2005),223 
Bolivia (2009),224 Kenya (2010),225 Zimbabwe (2013),226 and Egypt (2014).227 
These are only a few examples, but they reflect a powerful trend since World War 
II of multiplying forms and frequency of popular participation in constitutional 
design, whether before, during, or after the drafting of the constitutional text.228
This modern trend towards popular participation began in France and the 
United States, whose revolutionary traditions have made the will of the people 
central to constitutional meaning. Modern constitutional states such as India 
and Ireland have lived through their own democratic moments to legitimate 
their constitutions. Some of these moments have been easier than others, but 
all have resulted in the consolidation of a democracy in which most, if not all, 
members of the polity feel that the constitution is theirs. Some countries, perhaps 
most notably Germany, have tried to moderate the influence of direct popular 
participation. But they have nonetheless evolved methods to fill their constitution 
with sociological legitimacy, something that continues in many ways to escape 
the Constitution of Canada. The pressure building towards popular participation 
in Canada is therefore something to embrace, not suppress, because only through 
Canadians themselves can the Constitution ultimately be legitimated. 
IV. CONCLUSION
No constitutional text is a comprehensive catalogue of the constitutional rules 
that political actors recognize as binding. This is especially true in Canada, 
whose founding constitution is a statute “expected to embody the principles of 
the British parliamentary system, which rest for the most part on convention 
223. See “Iraqi constitution passes, officials say,” CNN (25 October 2005), online: <www.cnn.
com/2005/WORLD/meast/10/25/iraq.constitution>.
224. See Simon Romero, “Bolivians Ratify New Constitution,” The New York Times (25 January 
2009), online: <www.nytimes.com/2009/01/26/world/americas/26bolivia.html?_r=0>.
225. See “Kenyans back change to constitution in referendum,” BBC News (5 August 2010), 
online: <www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-10876635>.
226. See “Zimbabwe approves new constitution,” BBC News (19 March 2013), online: <www.bbc.
com/news/world-africa-21845444>.
227. See Reza Sayah & Mohammed Tawfeeq, “Egypt passes a new constitution,” CNN (18 
January 2014), online: <www.cnn.com/2014/01/18/world/africa/egypt-constitution>.
228. Justin Blount, Zachary Elkins & Tom Ginsburg, “Does the Process of Constitution-Making 
Matter?” in Tom Ginsburg, ed, Comparative Constitutional Design (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012) 31 at 38-39.
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rather than law.”229 These conventional understandings of the constitution exert 
a non-trivial constraint on political actors and indeed simulate the binding 
effect of a written constitutional rule.230 Conventions reflect the constitutional 
morality of the regime—a moral code that informally, though no less effectively, 
governs the conduct of political actors.231 Conventions arise by sustained political 
practice and may change thereafter by subsequent practice.232 There is then, as 
Hans Kelsen noted, “no legal possibility of preventing a constitution from being 
modified by way of custom, even if the constitution has the character of statutory 
law, if it is a so-called ‘written’ constitution,”233 as these unwritten alterations 
informally amend the written constitution by filling or creating voids in the text 
or by substituting or refining the text.234
The Constitution of Canada has long been recognized as susceptible 
to informal change as a result of a new convention.235 For example, I have 
demonstrated elsewhere that the Constitution of Canada has been changed by new 
conventions on the non-use of the British and Canadian powers of disallowance 
and reservation.236 I have also shown how a new conventional understanding, 
specific to Canada, has arisen that makes an ordinarily amendable constitutional 
provision unamendable.237 Canada is therefore an important site for the study 
of the interaction between unwritten constitutional norms and an entrenched 
constitutional text. But despite the extraordinary attention given to the use of 
referenda in Canada, the question whether the Charlottetown innovation has 
informally amended the Constitution of Canada to establish a new federal 
convention of national referendal consultation on major constitutional reforms 
has remained underexplored. Some commentators have suggested that political 
actors are bound by the precedent of the Charlottetown referendum, and others 
have suggested the contrary.238 
In this article, I have endeavoured to show that we cannot yet know whether 
such a convention has taken root in Canada. Although I have concluded that 
229. William S Livingston, “The Amending Power of the Canadian Parliament” (1951) 45:2 Am 
Pol Sci Rev 437 at 438.
230. See Albert, “Unwritten Constitutional Norms,” supra note 3.
231. Dicey, supra note 129 at cxli. 
232. Marshall, supra note 136 at 217.
233. General Theory of Law and State, translated by Anders Wedberg (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 1945) at 260.
234. See Albert, “Unwritten Constitutional Norms,” supra note 3.
235. See Hurley, supra note 9 at 14-16.
236. See Albert, “Constitutional Desuetude,” supra note 4 at 650-73.
237. See Albert, “Constitutional Amendment Rules,” supra note 5 at 672-74.
238. See the text accompanying notes 93-100.
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the Jennings test suggests that there is no convention of national referendal 
consultation—there has been only one instance of national referendal 
consultation, federal political actors are not bound by that single instance, and the 
Charlottetown innovation was not designed on a strong normative foundation—
the Jennings test cannot by itself tell us how political actors will act. Until federal 
political actors are faced with a choice to hold such a referendum or not, it 
remains unclear whether a federal convention exists. Should political actors opt 
to hold a referendum in connection with a future major constitutional reform, it 
may well be because they feel they have no choice but to seek popular input and 
consent. In that case we will know that they feel bound by the Charlottetown 
innovation. For now, though, the Charlottetown referendum cannot yet be called 
a convention without more information that can come only through another 
large-scale effort to amend the Constitution of Canada.
Nonetheless, it is plausible to predict that national referendal consultation 
will become an unwritten requirement of the constitutional amendment process 
for major constitutional reforms to the basic structure of the Constitution of 
Canada. But this informal change is less likely to arise in the near term out of a 
concretized federal convention on referendal consultation than from the various 
laws and practices of provincial referendal consultation and ratification as they 
multiply across provinces to eventually normalize the use of referenda in each 
of the provinces and territories. Still, this new constitutional convention would 
be a subnational one rooted in provincial and territorial political practice, not a 
federal convention anchored in federal practice. 
What is worrisome, in my view, is that a federal convention on referendal 
consultation could do more harm than good to democracy in Canada. The 
formal amendment rules entrenched in the Constitution Act, 1982 already 
make the Constitution of Canada one of the world’s most resistant to major 
reform, if not the most difficult to amend.239 To layer a federal conventional 
239. See Richard Albert, “The Difficulty of Constitutional Amendment in Canada” (2015) 
53:1 Alta L Rev 85. At the adoption of the Constitution Act, 1982, Canada’s new formal 
amendment rules were described as “unduly rigid.” See Walter Dellinger, “The Amending 
Process in Canada and the United States: A Comparative Perspective” (1982) 45:4 Law & 
Contemp Probs 283 at 300. In hindsight, it was justifiable to worry that the Constitution Act, 
1982 could “prove to be only a Pyrrhic victory, a largely symbolic success that will effectively 
bring the process to a halt.” See Michael B Stein, “Canadian Constitutional Reform, 
1927-1982: A Comparative Case Analysis Over Time” (1984) 14:1 Publius 121 at 139. 
Today, it is difficult to argue with Peter Oliver, one of Canada’s leading comparativists, that 
Canada’s formal amendment rules are “probably the most complex in the world.” See Peter 
Oliver, “Canada, Quebec, and Constitutional Amendment” (1999) 49:4 UTLJ 519 at 520.
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requirement of national referendal consultation onto the existing requirements 
for amendments to the basic structure of the Constitution of Canada would 
further complicate formal amendment, transforming a constitution that is at 
present freely amendable, though perhaps only in theory, into a constitution 
whose basic structure is in practice constructively unamendable.240 
We commonly associate referenda with democratic legitimacy.241 There are 
of course dangers with referenda—for instance, that they might undermine the 
institutions of representative democracy—but the greater risk is that a federal 
convention on national referendal consultation would undermine democracy 
itself by frustrating all future major constitutional reform efforts. The most 
fundamental of all democratic rights in a constitutional democracy is the 
right of self-definition, most directly reflected in the power of constitutional 
amendment.242 The power to amend the constitution is more than a mere 
procedural right; it is the core democratic right that authorizes those subject to 
the constitution to redesign it where necessary to keep it in line with their shared 
values.243 When the constitutional text becomes unchangeable and its rules of 
change do more to prevent than to facilitate self-government, the first casualties 
are democracy and the rule of law.244 How to balance constitutional flexibility 
with stability is an important design choice, the risk being that the constitution 
will be either too difficult or too easy to amend.245 But, in my view, a more 
amendable constitution is a lesser evil than a frozen one. 
The strongest counterview is that referendal consultation could work well in 
conjunction with the formal amendment rules in Part V of the Constitution Act, 
1982 to overcome what appears today to be a logjam in major formal amendment. 
Constitutional change would be easier than it currently is if political actors 
consulted the people in advance of ratifying votes in the legislative assemblies. 
On this view, the result of a federal referendum or of a series of subnational 
referenda would alert legislative actors to the preferences of the people, which 
would in turn allow them to make a better informed decision in choosing whether 
240. See generally Richard Albert, “Constructive Unamendability in Canada and the United 
States” (2014) 67 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 181 (theorizing the concept of “constructive 
unamendability,” which results from a political climate that makes it practically 
unimaginable, though always theoretically possible, to amend the constitution).
241. See Tierney, supra note 75 at 261-62.
242. See Richard Albert, “Counterconstitutionalism” (2008) 31:1 Dal LJ 1 at 49-51.
243. See Richard Albert, “Constitutional Handcuffs” (2010) 42:3 Ariz St LJ 663 at 698-99.
244. See Richard Albert, “Nonconstitutional Amendments” (2009) 22:1 Can JL & Jur 5 at 8-9.
245. See Emmet Macfarlane, “Unsteady Architecture: Ambiguity, the Senate Reference, and the 
Future of Constitutional Amendment in Canada” (2015) 60:4 McGill LJ 883 at 903.
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to ratify the proposed amendment. The reality, however, is that these referenda 
would amount to an informal delegation of the ratifying power, effectively 
shifting the ratifying decision away from the legislative assemblies, to whom 
the Constitution expressly assigns this decision-making responsibility. From my 
perspective, there is little more important than giving greater voice to the people 
of Canada in matters of major constitutional change. But we should recognize 
that this informal delegation of the ratifying power would in turn informally 
amend the Constitution’s formal amendment rules—a result that undermines 
the very purpose of codifying Canada’s intricate structure of formal amendment 
rules to begin with.
Referenda are of course useful vehicles to foster a culture of participatory 
democracy when they are incorporated into a larger program to enhance citizen 
participation. But it makes little sense, as a matter of democratic constitutional 
design, to require political actors in Canada to satisfy all of the existing textually 
entrenched thresholds for an amendment to the basic structure of the Constitution 
while also making referendal consultation an additional necessary condition of 
amendment. This would risk making it actually impossible to successfully pass a 
major formal amendment to the basic structure of the Constitution of Canada. 
The better design is to create alternative paths to major constitutional reform: one 
that proceeds through the existing rules of formal amendment and another that 
authorizes political actors to make major constitutional reforms when authorized 
by a successful national referendum. 
We therefore confront a paradox: In order to preserve the democratic right 
of constitutional amendment in Canada, major constitutional reform should not 
require national referendal consultation unless a national referendum becomes 
an alternative path, not an additional step, in constitutional amendment. The 
problem, of course, is that amending Canada’s formal amendment rules requires 
the unanimous agreement of both houses of Parliament and of each province,246 
a threshold that today seems virtually impossible to meet. Until the political 
climate becomes more amenable to the possibility of a grand federal bargain 
and political actors no longer feel themselves bound by the constitutional text, 
we will be constrained by the Constitution’s formal amendment rules to live 
with the challenge of near-unamendability. The costs of unamendability are not 
246. Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 8, s 41(e).
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insignificant,247 and the consequence may well be that the power of constitutional 
change will shift as a matter of necessity, if it has not already done so,248 from 
formal amendment by legislative actors in Parliament and provincial assemblies 
to informal amendment largely by the judiciary.
247. See Richard Albert, “The Unamendable Core of the United States Constitution” in András 
Koltay, ed, Comparative Perspectives on the Fundamental Freedom of Expression (Budapest: 
Wolters Kluwer, 2015) 13 at 23-24. See also Albert, “Amendment by Stealth,” supra 
note 2 at 724-36.
248. See Dennis Baker & Mark D Jarvis, “The End of Informal Constitutional Change in 
Canada?” in Emmett Macfarlane, ed, Constitutional Amendment in Canada (Toronto: 
Toronto University Press, 2016) [forthcoming].
